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Abstract 
This study examines the impact of foreign aid inflows to Tanzania on macroeconomic 
variables such as the real exchange rate, export performance, government expenditure, 
investment and growth. 
The main hypothesis of the study is that aid inflows cause real appreciation. To test 
this hypothesis, we used cointegration techniques and an error-correction model to estimate 
the long-run equilibrium and the short-run real exchange rate, respectively. 
The estimated model results suggest that foreign aid inflows, openness of the economy 
and devaluation of the local currency lead to depreciation of the real exchange rate, 
while government expenditure tends to appreciate the real exchange rate. 
The study recommends that the correct policy response to the influx of foreign aid is 
to direct the aid to domestic productive investment in order to induce a positive supply 
response. The government should also reduce its expenditure and enhance economic 
liberalization. 
I. Introduction 
Background 
The history of macroeconomic management in Tanzania is marked by pervasive controls 
(see Bevan et al., 1990). Consequent to the command and control policies, the economy 
experienced an appreciation of the real exchange rate, declines in export performance 
and falling real incomes in the late 1970s (see tables 1 and 2). The nature and causes of 
the economic crisis have been well documented (see Lipumba, 1984; Ndulu, 1987; 
Baregu, 1993). 
By the early 1980s, the government realized that it had to reform its policies. Economic 
reforms began with the introduction of the national economic survival programme (NESP) 
and the structural adjustment programme (SAP) in 1981 and 1982, respectively. The 
reform policies culminated in the economic recovery programmes, ERP I and ERP II, 
which started in 1986 and 1989, respectively. 
The most successful reforms were the economic recovery programmes, which were 
at the behest of and sponsored by the donor community, especially the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The main items of the reforms included 
devaluation of the local currency, decontrolling prices, government retrenchment policies 
and opening up the economy to international trade. Increased openness was to be achieved 
through liberalizing imports and promoting exports. 
Concomitant with the implementation of the reforms was a massive inflow of foreign 
aid that jumped in real terms from US$266.20 million in 1985 to US$522.27 million in 
1992 (see Table 1). As a percentage of the GDP the aid jumped from an average of 9% 
during 1983-1985 to 34% in 1986-1993, (see Table 1). Net official development 
assistance to Tanzania since 1986 has been around one billion current US dollars a year 
(see Table 2). 
Tanzania is among the leading aid-dependent countries in Africa. Tarimo (1995), 
who compared Tanzania with Kenya, Uganda, Ghana and Malawi, found that Tanzania 
receives more aid both in per capita terms and as a percentage of GDP than do the other 
countries in question. 
While seemingly beneficial, foreign aid inflows may generate undesirable effects in 
the economy. These undesirable effects — generally knows as Dutch disease — include 
a decline in export performance and manufacturing production caused by appreciation 
of the real exchange rate and resources moving out of manufacturing into other sectors.1 
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Table 1: Foreign aid and the real exchange rate in Tanzania (base year is 1977 for the real 
exchange rate) 
Year Aid as % Aid in 1977 RER2 Year Aid as % Aid in 1977 RER2 
of GDP mil US$1 of GDP mil US$1 
1967 2.3 52.83 99.5 1981 11.1 457.07 72.6 
1968 2.6 61.75 86.9 1982 10.7 434.98 62.5 
1969 3.4 81.61 79.3 1983 9.2 355.87 61.5 
1970 4.0 101.32 83.9 1984 9.4 321.34 59.6 
1971 4.6 116.53 92.0 1985 6.9 266.20 51.4 
1972 3.9 108.29 88.6 1986 13.8 346.67 145.2 
1973 5.4 162.67 88.1 1987 25.0 439.53 223.4 
1974 7.2 229.89 88.7 1988 30.3 485.49 246.7 
1975 11.7 373.04 97.2 1989 32.3 416.84 303.0 
1976 9.2 293.47 98.1 1990 45.2 498.88 309.7 
1977 9.0 315.00 100.0 1991 34.0 436.00 315.6 
1978 10.1 403.05 99.5 1992 49.5 522.27 335.0 
1979 13.2 517.37 112.8 1993 44.3 349.09 386.5 
1980 12.7 497.95 95.6 
'Deflated by average consumer price index of Tanzania's trade partners: United Kingdom (UK), Germany 
(GERM), Japan (JAP), Italy (ITAL), Saudi Arabia (SAUDI), United States of America (USA) and Sweden 
(SWED). 
2Real exchange rate defined as RER = E/ (oE.pPIF/CPITZ) where 0P CPIFi and CPITZ are, respectively, 
weight of trade partner /', nominal exchange rate of Tanzania shilling to a unit of the trade partner's currency, 
and trade partner CPI and Tanzania's CPI. 
The weights for the trade partners are: 
Year UK Germ Jap Ital Neth Saudi USA Swed 
1967-79 .220 .175 .183 .048 .052 .151 .142 .029 
1980-85 .292 .178 .158 .088 .121 .001 .111 .051 
1986-93 .273 .143 .173 .163 .074 .029 .069 .076 
Sources:BOS (1994a) National Accounts of Tanzania 1976-1993;BOS (1994b) Selected Statistical Series 
1951-1991; DAC, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries; IMF (1995) 
International Financial Statistics CD-ROM Disk. 
Arguments for foreign aid are based on the belief that the aid will contribute positively 
to the country's development efforts in terms of, among other things, supplementing 
domestic savings and achieving higher economic growth.2 However, one should realize 
that inflows of foreign aid cannot continue indefinitely given donor fatigue and the growing 
competition for aid funds (see Adams et al. 1994; Likwelile et al., 1994a/b; Wendler, 
1994). 
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3 
Year Aid OPEN1 Current GDP per Manufacturing Merchandise 
(mil US$) account capita in output as exports as 
deficit as 1976 prices % of GDP % of GDP 
% of GDP (1977=100) 
1967 23.61 44.4 0.2 96.2 10.2 23.8 
1968 28.56 42.4 0.6 98.6 10.4 21.6 
1969 39.30 39.6 -2.8 98.2 11.1 20.8 
1970 51.20 41.2 2.8 99.4 11.2 19.2 
1971 62.50 44.2 7.3 100.2 11.8 19.1 
1972 61.20 43.2 4.2 103.8 12.0 20.2 
1973 100.40 42.9 5.8 103.8 12.2 19.5 
1974 162.30 47.3 12.7 102.4 12.2 17.8 
1975 302.70 40.4 8.9 103.8 11.7 14.5 
1976 267.70 35.9 1.2 102.7 13.0 16.8 
1977 315.00 34.0 2.1 100.0 12.2 15.5 
1978 423.00 32.5 11.4 99.1 12.3 11.4 
1979 584.00 34.1 7.9 98.5 12.4 12.4 
1980 650.00 32.5 10.2 98.1 11.5 11.3 
1981 657.00 28.2 6.9 94.6 10.2 10.3 
1982 673.00 20.2 8.4 92.2 9.8 6.6 
1983 579.00 17.2 4.8 87.3 9.2 6.1 
1984 549.00 19.9 6.2 87.4 9.1 6.9 
1985 477.00 17.3 5.4 86.9 8.5 4.8 
1986 675.00 25.6 6.6 86.9 7.9 6.9 
1987 882.00 36.6 12.7 88.4 7.9 8.2 
1988 1012.00 42.6 11.3 89.0 8.1 11.6 
1989 917.00 52.3 12.9 89.6 8.4 14.6 
1990 1171.00 61.6 16.4 90.9 7.8 15.7 
1991 1081.00 51.7 14.2 93.3 8.2 11.4 
1992 1343.00 63.2 15.6 92.6 8.2 14.8 
1993 924.80 84.2 19.6 94.2 8.0 22.2 
Sources: BOS (1994 a&b); IMF (1995); and DAC, various issues. 
'OPEN = openness of the economy defined as the sum of merchandise exports and imports expressed as 
percentage of the GDP. 
The motives for foreign aid 
Foreign aid is defined as transfers from abroad that have a grant element. The transfers 
may be in the form of soft loans, grants or technical assistance. Foreign aid may be 
administered on bilateral, government to government, or multilateral basis. Multilateral 
aid is provided through international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and 
the various agencies of the United Nations. 
Aid can be provided for either self-interest or altruistic reasons (see Eaton, 1989). 
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Self-interest motives include the donor's own national security considerations and national 
economic benefits. This kind of aid is mostly exogenous; that is, the aid recipient country 
does not have to ask or negotiate for it. Altruistic reasons include the pursuit of an 
objective ethical function, relief aid to maintain current consumption levels in times of 
temporary shortfall in incomes, and development assistance to raise investment and future 
consumption. Foreign aid may also be a response to seemingly permanent low incomes 
in the recipient country. 
While relief or emergency aid may be exogenous, development assistance and aid 
coming to finance economic reforms is to a large extent endogenous. It responds to 
economic shocks in the recipient country and depends on negotiations between the 
government and the donor community (such as the IMF and the World Bank). While the 
donors may already have the aid money for disbursement, the actual flow of the funds 
depends — in most cases — on the intended country agreeing with and fulfilling the 
terms and conditions of the donors. 
Statement of the problem 
It has been observed that there has been a boom in foreign aid inflows to Tanzania since 
the mid 1980s. In theory, aid inflows should cause the real exchange rate to appreciate. 
Tanzania's experience, on the contrary, is that the aid inflows were marked by a 
depreciating real exchange rate. Contrary to Dutch disease postulates, the massive aid 
inflow was also accompanied by high positive growth in manufacturing production and 
export performance. This prompts us to analyse the macroeconomic impacts of foreign 
aid and the potential for aid-induced Dutch disease in the country. 
Relevance to existing analysis 
The findings of our study seem to corroborate what has already been established in 
empirical studies on foreign aid and the Dutch disease in Tanzania and a few other African 
countries. 
Using an econometric model, Ogun (1995) found that capital inflow to Ghana caused 
the real exchange rate to depreciate. In the study by Bevan et al. (1993) for Kenya, it was 
found that the spending effect of the 1976-1979 coffee boom was negligible and that 
rather than causing a Dutch disease the boom produced a construction boom. The results 
of the two studies for Ghana and Kenya corroborate our study. 
In their study of foreign aid and the Dutch disease in Tanzania, Adams et al. (1994) 
found that the allocation of foreign aid and other resources is an important factor in 
determining export performance. They argued that the state-led, import-substituting 
industrial policy biased resource allocation against production for export and thus limited 
the performance of the latter. The study also found that the aid inflows were buying 
economic reforms and policy changes that were pro-tradeables and dampened the potential 
for the aid-induced real appreciation. 
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Falck (1992) found that foreign aid was mostly spent on the services sector, which 
increased upward pressure on domestic prices and potential for real appreciation. 
Luvanda and Mndeme-Musonda (1992) studied the Dutch disease effects of the 1976/ 
77 coffee boom in Tanzania and concluded that the boom was mostly used to finance 
siovernment expenditure. 
The Adams et al. (1994), Falck (1992), and Luvanda and Mndeme-Musonda (1992) 
studies stopped short of giving an empirical analysis of the real exchange rate 
determination to support their findings. Ndulu (1993) and Ndulu and Semboja (1993) 
did estimate the real exchange rate for Tanzania, but did not include foreign aid or capital 
inflows as an explicit determinant. These gaps will be filled by our study. 
Hypothesis 
The main hypothesis to be tested in this study is that foreign aid inflows into Tanzania 
caused the real exchange rate to appreciate. We will test this hypothesis by using the 
theory of real exchange rate determination. 
II. Foreign aid, Dutch disease and 
macroeconomic management in 
Tanzania 
The Dutch disease model 
The term "Dutch disease" was first used to reflect the decline in the Netherlands' export 
competitiveness following the discovery of the Groningen gas fields in the early 1970s 
(Benjamin et al., 1989). 
Most studies of Dutch disease have been done for developed countries. The impact 
of a discovery of natural resources or an influx of foreign revenues may be different in 
developing countries for three main reasons (Benjamin et al., 1989). First, it is agriculture 
rather than manufacturing that is most likely to be hurt. Second, as domestic prices rise, 
consumers may not shift entirely to imported goods since the domestically produced 
manufactured goods are imperfect substitutes for goods sold in world markets. Third, 
the resource movement effect associated with the influx of foreign revenues may be 
limited if the booming sector is an enclave that uses mainly imported capital and labour. 
Alternatively, if foreign aid is spent on imports there may be little or no impact on the 
real exchange rate or on the resource movement effect. 
Dutch disease refers to the coexistence within the traded goods sector of progressing 
and declining, or booming and lagging, sub-sectors (Corden and Neary, 1982). A boom 
in one of the traded goods sectors (due to, for example, a discovery of natural resources) 
raises the marginal product of the mobile factors employed in that sector. Higher factor 
returns in the booming sector will draw mobile factors away from the other sectors and 
into the booming sector. This is the resource movement effect. The non-booming sectors 
will thus contract. The higher real incomes resulting from the boom lead to extra spending 
on non-tradeables, which raises their price. This is the spending effect. The spending 
effect will, in turn, cause the real exchange rate to appreciate. 
The effects of increased incomes from natural resources is similar to an increase in 
foreign aid inflows (see Edwards and van Wijnbergen, 1989). They all have the potential 
for causing the real exchange rate to appreciate. 
In the Dutch disease model, the real exchange rate (RER) is defined as the domestic 
relative price of tradeable goods (P T) to non-tradeable goods (PN), that is, RER=P T /P N . 3 
This definition of the real exchange rate summarizes incentives that guide resource 
movement across the traded and non-traded goods sectors. An increase in the real 
exchange rate is referred to as real depreciation and will make the production of traded 
goods relatively more profitable, inducing resource movement out of the non-tradeable 
and into the tradeable goods sector. The real exchange rate thus defined also provides a 
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good indicator of the country's competitiveness in the world markets. 
The RER measures the cost of domestically producing the traded goods. When the 
RHR declines — that is, when there is real appreciation — it signifies that the domestic 
cost of producing tradeable goods is increasing. If relative prices in the rest of the world 
are constant, the decline in the real exchange rate corresponds to a deterioration of the 
country's international competitiveness. The country is thus producing the tradeable 
gootls in a relatively (that is relative to the rest of the world) less efficient way than 
before. A real depreciation, on the other hand, represents an improvement in the country's 
degree of international competitiveness. 
The real exchange rate and some main determinants 
One of the pertinent questions of this study is whether or not foreign aid causes Dutch 
disease in Tanzania. Foreign aid may cause Dutch disease only if the aid inflow causes 
I lie real exchange rate to appreciate. This calls for an analysis of the determinants of the 
real exchange rate. 
As already noted, Tanzania faced severe economic crisis beginning in the late 1970s. 
The bad performance of the economy meant the government was less able to balance its 
budget and hence took recourse to increased borrowing and foreign assistance. In Table 
1 it can be seen that foreign aid measured in 1977 prices increased during 1967-1979 
and declined during 1979-1985. Thereafter it increased again. 
The measured real exchange rate seemed to follow the same trend as the aid inflow; 
that is, the RER depreciated as aid inflows increased and appreciated as aid declined. 
This positive correlation between aid inflows and the RER is inconsistent with the real 
exchange rate and Dutch disease theories. These theories predict that, if there is one — 
freely functioning —foreign exchange market, aid inflows would result in real 
appreciation. It must be noted, though, that foreign exchange in Tanzania was being 
rationed during most of the period. If foreign exchange is being rationed it can result in 
movements of the real exchange rate that are different from those that would occur in the 
case of a freely functioning foreign exchange market. 
One possible explanation of the trade-off between a depreciating real exchange rate 
and increasing aid inflows is that there were some offsetting capital flows (or "capital 
flight"), or that the impact of the aid was neutralized through increased imports or 
sterilization by the central bank. 4 However, a look at the trends in net private transfers 
and capital flows in the balance of payments statistics in Table 3 suggests that there was 
more capital flowing into than out of the country throughout the period in question. 
Hence capital outflows may not be strongly argued to have offset the impact of the aid 
inflows. 
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Table 3: Selected balance of payments stat ist ics in Tanzania (mil l ion US$) 
Year Trade Net private Current 
balance transfers account 
balance 
Net long- Net short- Changes in 
term capital term capital reserves 
1970 -33.2 12.8 -35.6 71.6 -56.6 20.6 
1971 -83.3 3.5 -99.8 137.7 -51.2 13.3 
1972 -43.6 -14.5 -65.7 108.4 7.3 -50.0 
1973 -74.2 -14.4 -107.5 139.5 0.0 -32.0 
1974 -261.2 -11.4 -285.3 124.7 23.0 137.5 
1975 -297.1 11.5 230.0 206.4 8.9 14.7 
1976 -65.2 11.5 -33.7 102.4 -46.4 -22.3 
1977 -108.2 19.4 -70.2 96.6 133.8 -160.1 
1978 -516.5 23.1 -472.0 136.0 164.8 171.2 
1979 -415.0 29.5 -345.2 225.4 62.8 57.0 
1980 -506.4 21.8 -521.2 289.1 166.0 66.0 
1981 448.3 22.6 -406.6 295.3 114.3 -3.0 
1982 -539.1 25.4 -523.3 345.1 176.5 1.8 
1983 -325.2 18.7 -304.6 238.3 107.7 -41.5 
1984 -361.8 63.0 -359.0 -46.3 437.6 -32.3 
1985 -540.7 236.3 -375.1 20.6 348.5 6.0 
1986 -577.4 250.6 -321.1 1204.8 -860.7 -23.0 
1987 -712.6 314.3 -446.0 221.2 155.6 69.2 
1988 -646.5 231.9 -375.8 261.0 117.2 -2.4 
1989 -655.0 182.4 -367.3 286.6 60.6 20.1 
1990 -778.6 158.5 -425.1 387.8 176.4 -139.1 
1991 -922.6 269.2 -451.3 228.2 262.0 -38.9 
1992 -912.9 325.0 -421.9 162.2 357.9 -98.2 
1993 -837.9 193.2 -408.5 321.9 35.5 51.1 
Source: World Bank (1995), World Tables 1995. 
A decline in the level of trade restrictions is one of the factors that has tended to 
depreciate the real exchange rate in Tanzania. The sharp decline in trade and exchange 
controls after 1986 resulted in a rapid increase in the openness of the economy, which in 
turn led to a rapid depreciation of the real exchange rate during that period (see Tables 1 
and 2). Trade liberalization has also been found to be a significant determinant of the 
real exchange rate in the country (see, for example, Ndulu, 1993). 
The trend in imports indicates that storable imports as a percentage of the GDP 
averaged 7% during 1967-1991 (see Table 4). The aid boom beginning in 1986 was not 
followed by an increase in storable imports. As a percentage of the GDP, storable imports 
during 1986-1991 remained at 7% as was the case for the sample period average. Hence 
Tanzanians did not save the aid. A look at the trend in foreign assets that correspond to 
both the money base and the money supply indicates that foreign assets declined during 
the aid boom compared to non-boom years (see Table 4). Hence the aid money was left 
to filter into the economy unsterilized. 
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Table 4: Imports and net bank foreign assets in Tanzania 
Year Storable Total imports Net foreign Net foreign 
imports as % of GDP assets as % of assets as % c 
as % of GDP' money supply base money : 
1967 6.5 18.5 37.3 50.1 
1968 5.7 19.5 31.3 52.3 
1969 5.3 17.2 32.3 52.4 
1970 8.2 21.1 32.7 30.6 
1971 10.3 24.6 33.0 23.9 
1972 8.9 22.8 43.3 43.1 
1973 8.4 24.0 43.6 51.2 
1974 8.3 30.4 20.2 14.8 
1975 9.2 27.9 17.2 15.2 
1976 6.6 19.2 19.2 24.7 
1977 7.6 21.3 28.4 51.7 
1978 10.9 27.6 2.4 14.7 
1979 8.6 25.0 6.4 10.7 
1980 7.3 24.9 6.9 4.5 
1981 7.1 20.5 4.1 3.9 
1982 6.6 18.1 3.1 2.7 
1983 4.2 12.0 6.5 2.5 
1984 3.6 10.9 -25.1 4.0 
1985 4.1 12.7 17.8 0.7 
1986 3.6 19.1 -25.6 6.0 
1987 4.1 26.2 -30.0 2.8 
1988 5.9 24.4 -26.0 6.2 
1989 9.6 36.0 -19.0 5.2 
1990 8.0 52.6 4.7 10.5 
1991 12.4 48.6 12.6 11.0 
Source: Computed from BOT, Economic and Operations Report, various issues. 
'Storable imports are machinery and metal imports. 
2Base money in money at the central bank. 
Since foreign aid was neither saved by the economic agents nor sterilized by the 
monetary authorities, it may be argued that Tanzanians perceive the aid inflow to be 
permanent. The rate of foreign aid flowing into Tanzania has been quite substantial 
since 1967. Expressed in real terms, foreign aid has been flowing at an average annual 
rate of 7.5% between 1967 and 1993. There may thus be reason for Tanzanians to suspect 
that aid inflows will not decline in the future, but this should be a cause for concern, as 
we noted above that aid inflows cannot continue indefinitely. A development strategy 
based on foreign assistance is bound to fail once the aid is cut significantly. 
Since aid was perceived by agents to be permanent, and since the aid money was not 
being sterilized, the real exchange rate in Tanzania should have appreciated in the late 
1980s and early 1990s when there was a boom in aid inflows. As discussed above, the 
inability of aid inflows to explain the real depreciation may be explained by the dominating 
impact of economic liberalization and the devaluation of the nominal exchange rate. 
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Macroeconomic impacts of foreign aid 
Apart from being a potential cause of Dutch disease — in particular, decline in the tradeablc 
sectors — foreign aid may also have an impact on government expenditure patterns 
money supply, inflation, domestic savings, investment and growth (see also Eaton, 19X9-
and Likwelile et al., 1994b). 
Foreign aid and government expenditure 
In Table 5 it can be seen that the government managed to keep a high and undiminishing 
proportion of recurrent expenditure, which 
Table 5: Indicators of macroeconomic impacts of foreign aid (inflation and growth rates 
are in percentage) 
Year Inflation Nominal Recumt Develop Domestic Domestic GDP per 
(changes money governt governt savings investmt capita % 
in CPI) supply % expend expend as % of as % of growth 
growth as % of 
GDP 
as % of 
GDP 
GDP GDP 
1967 13.04 -7.04 13.94 4.01 17.91 16.78 1.56 
1968 15.38 15.85 13.53 4.37 16.71 16.54 2.48 
1969 16.67 17.86 14.34 5.57 17.49 14.67 -0.42 
1970 2.86 4.86 16.64 6.66 17.11 20.47 1.29 
1971 5.56 19.31 16.62 8.44 17.56 24.17 0.79 
1972 7.89 14.54 15.94 6.61 16.61 21.16 3.58 
1973 9.76 19.20 17.37 5.68 14.18 19.84 0.05 
1974 20.00 24.33 17.42 10.27 8.42 18.96 -1.40 
1975 25.93 23.38 20.84 11.70 8.32 18.62 1.35 
1976 6.62 26.05 15.22 9.23 20.69 21.13 -1.01 
1977 11.72 21.09 16.29 11.24 22.80 23.08 -2.62 
1978 11.73 13.31 17.29 10.27 10.01 22.79 -0.92 
1979 13.81 37.41 22.86 13.06 13.31 23.68 -0.66 
1980 30.10 30.83 22.42 12.89 9.82 20.49 -0.34 
1981 25.37 22.19 20.83 11.40 16.20 21.64 -3.57 
1982 29.17 17.97 22.69 8.90 13.60 18.59 -2.51 
1983 26.96 14.72 20.69 6.25 8.42 10.99 -5.37 
1984 36.12 8.10 17.94 5.02 7.20 13.47 0.17 
1985 33.33 9.42 17.86 5.78 7.11 13.99 -0.54 
1986 32.40 31.30 14.95 4.91 5.46 17.96 -0.09 
1987 29.98 33.47 15.25 2.75 11.47 28.74 1.65 
1988 31.20 34.27 16.95 2.81 -4.82 29.38 0.84 
1989 25.82 35.74 20.11 3.21 2.72 31.69 0.64 
1990 19.71 32.90 22.13 2.38 11.49 43.03 1.38 
1991 22.29 32.90 23.26 3.10 4.38 33.17 2.61 
1992 22.07 26.23 25.38 3.86 4.64 37.79 -0.64 
Source: BOS (1994 a&b); IMF (1995). 
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averaged 15% and 20% of GDP during 1967-1978 and 1979-1992, respectively. 
Government development expenditure was, on average, only 6% of GDP during 1979-
1992, having slightly declined from an average of 8% during 1967-1978. 
The foreign aid boom of the late 1980s and early 1990s was marked by a declining 
share of government development expenditure and increasing recurrent expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP. Government development expenditure was the lowest (only 3% of 
GDP) during 1986-1992, while recurrent expenditure averaged 20% of GDP during the 
same time. This tends to suggest that the influx of foreign aid allowed the government to 
free resources from development expenditure in order to maintain or increase its recurrent 
expenditure. 
Foreign aid, money supply and inflation 
In theory, foreign aid inflows will lead to increased money supply and inflation if the aid 
money is not sterilized by contractionary monetary policies or used to purchase imports. 
As can be seen in Tables 1 and 5, the rising trend in foreign aid inflow has been 
accompanied by high rates of money growth and inflation. This underscores the contention 
that the Tanzanian government let the aid money filter into the economy, causing 
macroeconomic management problems — that is, high inflation rate and the increasing 
potential for the real exchange rate to appreciate. 
Foreign aid and domestic savings 
Proponents of foreign aid argue that since aid is a resource it should lead to increased 
investment and growth. Economic growth will consequently lead to higher incomes and 
increased savings. In Table 5, however, it can be seen that domestic savings as a percentage 
of GDP was, on average, only 5% during 1986-1992 compared to 13% a decade earlier. 
This would suggest that in Tanzania foreign aid has been replacing domestic savings. 
This contention on the negative correlation between foreign aid or capital inflows and 
domestic savings in Tanzania is shared by Mjema (1985,1994), Likwelile et al. (1994b) 
and Mwinyimvua (1988). 
Foreign aid, manufacturing and export performance 
According to the Dutch disease theory, the influx of foreign aid will result in declining 
exports and manufacturing performance. However, in the long run and if properly 
invested, foreign aid may lead to improved manufacturing and export performance. A 
look through Table 6 will reveal that growth in the manufacturing sector was negative 
during 1977-1986 but positive during 1986-1992. The negative growth in manufacturing 
production coincided with relatively lower foreign aid inflows, while the higher aid inflow 
during 1986 was marked with record high positive growth rates. This observation does 
not corroborate the Dutch disease hypothesis of negative correlation between aid inflows 
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and manufacturing production. 
Since the effectiveness of aid depends on resource allocation across sectors, an analysis 
of the structure of investment in the country is pertinent. 
Table 6: Tanzania gross domestic product at 1976 prices (percentage growth) 
Year Agriculture Manufacturing Energy and Transport and Public 
water communication administration 
1977-82 1.05 -2.69 11.47 0.50 7.33 
1982-86 4.64 -3.58 6.68 -2.93 -2.41 
1986-92 5.49 4.97 0.33 3.67 2.34 
1977 1.15 -6.05 11.42 -1.96 6.62 
1978 -1.66 3.37 17.21 2.84 12.01 
1979 0.76 3.33 11.19 -3.83 12.44 
1980 3.88 -4.89 25.79 11.26 1.37 
1981 0.99 -11.22 4.25 -9.13 11.39 
1982 1.35 -3.27 0.71 2.54 0.14 
1983 2.85 -8.72 1.67 -13.05 -3.37 
1984 4.01 2.66 6.31 0.61 0.06 
1985 6.00 -3.89 5.01 1.82 1.89 
1986 5.73 -4.05 18.00 -0.33 -10.81 
1987 4.40 4.52 7.35 5.59 0.56 
1988 4.48 7.06 -1.71 3.46 3.08 
1989 4.58 7.68 -29.27 12.72 3.95 
1990 6.61 -2.54 26.35 -3.40 2.24 
1991 9.55 11.51 13.65 1.17 2.04 
1992 3.46 2.15 -3.95 3.15 1.67 
Source: BOS (1993 & 1994a) National Accounts of Tanzania 
The picture emerging from the distribution of gross fixed capital formation by sector 
(Table 7) is that of declining resources allocated to agriculture (which is the mainstay of 
employment and exports) and of (virtually) undiminishing resources allocated to the 
manufacturing (the importables) sector. However, despite high rates of investment by 
international standards—more than twice the average rate in 16% of sub-Saharan Africa 
(World Bank, 1994b, pg. 38) — growth has been only modest. Anti-export bias in resource 
allocation and low capacity utilization (below 30%) are the main reasons behind the 
sluggish growth (see Adams et al., 1994). 
The relationship between foreign aid and export performance is mainly through the 
real exchange rate and the disincentive the aid provides to policy makers. Foreign aid 
usually comes in terms of foreign exchange or goods and services that would otherwise 
be imported by the recipient country. The aid recipient's urge to produce for export is 
thus diminished. 
In theory, export performance responds positively to price incentives or the real 
exchange rate. Empirical studies for Tanzania seem to confirm this contention. In the 
study by Ndulu and Semboja (1993), for example, it is shown that a depreciating real 
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exchange rate tends to stimulate exports. This would suggest that since, at least in theory, 
foreign aid tends to cause real appreciation, it may discourage production for export. 
This is the dilemma to which policy makers must address themselves. How can the 
country overcome this dilemma? The answer depends on how the country manages the 
influx of the foreign aid. Profligate spending of aid money will always result in undesirable 
consequences. 
Table 7- Gross fixed capital formation by economic activity in current prices (as 
percentage of total investment, unless otherwise stated) 
Year Agriculture Manufacturing Transport and Public Other Total 
communication administration sectors investment 
1976 8.61 26.03 31.61 12.66 21.09 5159 
1977 6.72 33.50 25.90 11.48 22.40 6663 
1978 9.22 22.81 30.80 13.56 23.61 7330 
1979 7.98 21.71 29.38 20.87 20.06 8592 
1980 8.08 22.65 22.17 22.03 25.06 8630 
1981 7.84 22.72 22.33 21.07 26.04 10624 
1982 7.82 27.92 19.97 17.66 26.63 10825 
1983 12.54 22.24 24.34 15.58 25.30 7752 
1984 12.47 21.62 23.71 12.11 30.09 11973 
1985 2.83 26.55 29.97 8.14 32.51 16872 
1986 2.55 20.45 27.42 6.22 43.36 26939 
1987 11.82 24.09 27.20 7.39 29.50 65608 
1988 6.65 17.77 26.91 5.82 42.85 102392 
1989 2.37 22.18 27.40 5.34 42.71 144087 
1990 2.97 23.79 32.17 5.75 35.32 178475 
1991 4.75 22.75 30.72 6.20 35.58 250252 
1992 4.59 23.51 32.11 6.65 33.14 337325 
Source: BOS (1994a; 1993). 
Foreign aid, investment and growth 
The theoretical positive relationship between foreign aid and growth seems to be valid in 
Tanzania. In Tables 1 and 5, it can be seen that the boom in the aid inflow during 1986-
1992 was marked by record high domestic investment to GDP ratios averaging 32% and 
positive growth in real per capital GDP averaging 1.07%. On the contrary, lower aid 
inflow in the previous decade (1976-1996) was marked by a lower domestic investment 
ratio (averaging 19%) and negative growth of -1.84% of the real per capita GDP. 
Given that foreign aid seems to promote investment and growth in Tanzania, it is 
pertinent to ask whether or not (and to what extent) the country should continue to depend 
on foreign aid in order to achieve higher investment ratios and positive growth given the 
potential for a drastic cut-back in aid. 
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Foreign exchange allocation and productivity growth 
In the analysis of the Dutch disease problem, it is pertinent to examine the allocation of 
foreign exchange resources, especially the extent to which the resources have been used 
to enhance productivity in the tradeables sectors. 
Looking through Table 8 we may see that, during 1986-1992, foreign exchange was 
allocated mainly to the energy and water, manufacturing, transport and communications, 
and agricultural sectors. 
Table 8: Foreign exchange allocation by sector (percentages, unless otherwise stated) 
Sector 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 Average 
Agriculture 16.1 18.0 18.6 13.6 17.2 15.2 16.5 
Transport and 
communication 17.2 19.2 14.6 15.7 12.7 12.2 15.3 
Energy and 
water 25.1 25.2 23.6 23.2 22.0 22.7 23.6 
Manufacturing 17.9 14.1 15.2 15.7 15.7 15.2 15.6 
Mining 2.3 2.5 3.0 4.3 4.6 5.3 3.6 
Construction 4.9 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.1 3.5 4.4 
Community 
services 8.6 8.0 7.6 7.7 8.0 7.5 7.9 
Others 7.9 8.5 12.9 15.2 15.7 18.4 13.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total foreign 
exchange 
(million US$) 1205.8 1230.2 1300.4 1332.0 1421.0 1510.0 
Source: Computed from Economic Recovery Programme 1 (Table 4.2) and Economic Recovery 
Programme II (Table 3). 
The impact of foreign aid allocation on productivity may be deduced from Table 6, 
where it is shown that growth in the tradeable sectors (agriculture and manufacturing) 
increased during 1986-1992. The manufacturing sector recorded an average annual 
growth rate of 5% during 1986-1992 compared to the annual decline of between 3% and 
4% in the previous nine years. The growth in agriculture was positive during the period 
in question, jumping from an average annual growth rate of 1% during 1977-1982 to 
about 5% during 1982-1992. All this seems to suggest that foreign exchange (or aid) 
allocation in Tanzania has had a positive impact on productivity. 
Policy recipe for managing foreign aid 
From the above discussion, we may say that the response of the Tanzanian government 
to the influx of foreign aid has been a combination of expansionary macroeconomic (or 
monetary) policies, running down foreign exchange reserves and maintaining the share 
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of storable imports in the gross domestic product. 
Policy responses to foreign aid booms depend on whether the shock is temporary or 
permanent (see Younger, 1992). For temporary windfalls, the basic life-cycle consumption 
theory suggests that economic agents would prefer to spread the benefit of the boom 
over time with a larger proportion of the aid being saved. In such a case, the aid has less 
potential for Dutch disease. However, saving aid may be undesirable from the policy 
perspective since it implies lending the aid abroad and thus making it unavailable for 
financing domestic investment. The correct policy response to the influx of aid would 
be to direct it to domestic productive investment to induce a positive supply response 
over lime. 
1 f the foreign aid inflow is in fact permanent, there is less need for policy intervention 
as most of the aid is spent on imports. 
Since foreign aid tends to generate real appreciation if spent for investment purposes 
or directly on final consumption of domestic goods and services, the government should 
adopt other policies to offset the impact of the aid inflows. Such policies include increasing 
openness to international trade, and non-inflationary fiscal and monetary policies. 
III. Determining the real exchange rate in 
Tanzania 
This section discusses the determination of the real exchange rate and estimates ilie 
static long-run equilibrium and dynamic short-run RER models in Tanzania. This will 
help us to assess whether or not foreign aid causes real appreciation and hence the potenl i a I 
of the aid to cause Dutch disease in the country. 
The real exchange rate and its determinants 
In the long run, the real exchange rate is determined by real variables only. In the short 
run, however, devaluation of the nominal exchange rate and macroeconomic policy are 
also important determinants (see Edwards, 1989). 
Nominal exchange rate is a monetary concept that measures the relative price of two 
currencies, that is, the price of foreign currency in terms of the domestic currency. The 
actual or observed real exchange rate (RER), on the other hand, is a real concept measuring 
the relative price of two goods. It is defined as the ratio of the price of tradeable goods 
to the price of non-tradeable goods. 
Changes in the RER may be justified by real events in the economy such as 
technological progress and changes in the international terms of trade. Such changes are 
equilibrium phenomena and may not require policy intervention. There can also be 
unjustified departure of the observed real exchange rate from its equilibrium value. The 
unjustified departures are cases of real exchange rate disequilibrium or misalignment of 
the real exchange rate. Real exchange rate misalignment is defined as sustained deviation 
of the actual real exchange rate from its long-run equilibrium level. If the actual RER is 
below the equilibrium real exchange rate, we have over-valuation of the real exchange 
rate. If the actual real exchange rate exceeds its equilibrium level, then we have under-
valuation of the RER. 
Equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) is defined as that relative price of tradeables 
to non-tradeables that is compatible with attainment of internal and external equilibrium. 
Internal equilibrium means that the non-tradeable goods market clears in the current 
period and is expected to be in equilibrium in future periods. External equilibrium means 
that the current account balances (current and future) are compatible with long-run 
sustainable capital flows. 
The determination of the equilibrium real exchange rate has been well elaborated in, 
for example, Edwards (1989), Elbadawi (1993) and Ndulu (1993). In the analysis of the 
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ERER, it is important to separate the variables that enter the long-run specification, that 
is the fundamentals, from the short-run influences that affect the dynamic behaviour of 
the real exchange rate. In theory of equilibrium real exchange rate, the most important 
fundamental determinants of the ERER are: foreign aid or net capital inflows; external 
terms of trade; government consumption of non-tradeables; exchange and trade controls; 
and technological progress. The model for the ERER can thus be written as: 
Uk(ERER), = A0 + Al og(AID)I +a2log(TOT)t + a3log(GCON)t 
+ a4log( OPEN)t + aslog(TEKP)i + \xt (1) 
where ERER is equilibrium real exchange rate as defined above; AID is net official 
development assistance expressed as a percentage of the GDP; TOT is external terms of 
trade; GCON is government consumption as a percentage of the GDP; OPEN is openness 
of the economy defined as the sum of exports and imports expressed as a percentage of 
the GDP; TEKP is technological progress proxied by time trend; and ju, is an error term. 
The ODA figures were obtained from the various issues of DAC, Geographical 
Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries. The data on external terms of 
trade were obtained from the World Bank World Tables. The data on openness and 
government consumption were obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics. 
Foreign aid (and net capital) inflows tend to cause an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate by increasing real incomes and consequently the demand for both traded and non-
traded goods. Since prices of importables are determined in the world market, a surge in 
demand for such goods will have no impact on domestic prices as long as the nominal 
exchange rate is not altered. The increase in the demand for non-tradeables, however, 
will put upward pressure on domestic prices and thus cause real appreciation. 
The effect of terms of trade shocks on the equilibrium real exchange rate depends on 
whether or not the income effect exceeds the substitution effect. If the income effect 
associated with a terms of trade deterioration dominates the substitution effect, a worsening 
of the terms of trade will result in an equilibrium real depreciation. 
The imposition of tariffs will generally result in real appreciation. With initial low 
rates, the import tariffs (either temporarily or permanently) will usually generate an 
equilibrium real appreciation in the current and future periods. A sufficient condition is 
that there is (net) substitutability in demand among all three types of goods — exportable, 
importable and non-tradeable. For this result to hold when initial tariffs are high, we 
need, in addition, that income effects do not dominate substitution effects. If, however, 
there is complementarity in consumption, it is possible that the imposition of import 
tariffs will generate a real equilibrium depreciation. 
Empirical studies for Tanzania suggest that tariffs are not significant determinants of 
the behaviour of the real exchange rate (see, for example, Ndulu, 1993). We instead use 
the openness of the economy as a proxy for trade and exchange controls. An increase in 
the openness will tend to cause real depreciation. 
The effect of an increase in government consumption on the equilibrium real exchange 
l ate depends on the composition of this consumption. If it falls fully on non-tradeables, 
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the equilibrium real exchange rate will tend to appreciate. If it falls fully on tradeables 
there will be an equilibrium real depreciation. For these effects to hold, we assume thai 
increased government consumption is financed through an increase in public debt, which, 
in turn, requires a hike in taxes to be sustainable (see Edwards, 1989, pg. 46). 
Technical progress also has an impact on the equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER). 
According to Balassa (1964), if the gains of productivity improvement are higher in the 
tradeable relative to the non-tradeable sectors, there will be an appreciation of the ERER 
— the Ricardo-Balassa effect (see Ghura and Grennes, 1993). This is because the 
technological progress in the tradeables sector will result in a greater shift to the right of 
the supply curve for tradeable goods than the shift in supply for non-traded goods. The 
price of tradeable goods will thus fall relative to that of the non-tradeables. Technological 
progress may also increase the demand for non-traded goods due to the income effect. 
Nominal devaluation will tend to cause a depreciation of the observed real exchange 
rate while expansionary macroeconomic policy will cause the real exchange rate to 
appreciate. 
Following Edwards (1989), the dynamics of the real exchange rate can be captured 
by the following equation: 
A log RERf = 0{log ERERf - log RER(^} - X{Zf - Zf*} 
+0{\ogEt-\ogEt_l} ( 2 ) 
where RER ( is the actual or measured real exchange rate; ERER t is the equilibrium real 
exchange rate, which is itself a function of real variables (the "fundamentals") only; Z is 
an index of macroeconomic policies; Z* is the sustainable level of macroeconomic 
policies; E ( is the nominal exchange rate; and 0 , X and 0 are positive parameters capturing 
the most important aspects of the adjustment process. 
The short-run real exchange rate model is obtained by substituting Equation 1 into 
Equation 2 and replacing the expressions for the macroeconomic and devaluation variables 
in Equation 2 to get 
log(RER) =fi0 +J3l og(AID)t +fi2log (TOT), +/lJog(GCON)i 
+fiJog(OPEN)l + fi5log(TEKP)t -fi6logRERu +J37log(CRED)t +fihDLEXt 
+ H, (3) 
where the B.'s (i=l,..8) are positive parameters and RER, AID, TOT, GCON, OPEN and 
TEKP are as defined above. CRED is a proxy for macroeconomic policy and DLEX is 
devaluation of the local currency. The data on domestic credit and nominal exchange 
rate were obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics. 
Econometric results of the empirical RER models 
In order to avoid spurious regression, we use cointegration techniques in estimating the 
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real exchange rate model. Behind the cointegration technique lies the idea that some 
non-stationary variables may drift apart in the short run but may eventually converge 
toward an equilibrium in the long run. In order to test this hypothesis, we first have to 
determine whether the variables in question are stationary or non-stationary. A stationary 
time series has a finite variance, transitory innovations from the mean and a tendency to 
return to its mean value. In contrast, a non-stationary series has a variance that is 
asymptotic infinite, with permanent innovations to the series; moreover, the series rarely 
crosses the mean (in finite samples). 
According to Granger (1986) and Engle and Granger (1987), a non-stationary time 
series X is said to be integrated of order d (or 1(d) if it achieves stationarity after being 
ditferentiated d times. In turn, two 1(d) variables are said to be cointegrated if a linear 
combination of them is integrated of any order less than d. 
In Table 9 we present the stationarity tests for the variables used for the static 
cointegration equation and the dynamic short-run RER model. 
Table 9: Unit root tests for the RER model variables 
Sample: 1969-1993 Sample: 1971 -1993 
Critical value at Critical value at 
Variable 5% level = -3.603 5% level = -3.622 
t-adf t-adf 
log(RER), -1.1804 
log(RER) -1.5607 
log(AID), -2.1717 
log(AID), -2.2249 
log(OPEN), -0.0915 
log(OPEN) -0.5786 
log(GTEX) -1.8721 
log(GTEX) -2.0780 
ECT -5.0574 
ECT t2 -3.9035 
DL(RER) -3.6427 
DL(RER) -3.0470 
DL(AID) -4.7050 
DL(AID) -3.1241 
DL(OPEN) -3.4021 
DL{OPEN) -2.6733 
DL(GTEX) -4.1438 
DL(GTEX) -3.6372 
DL(CRED). -5.1544 
DL(CRED) -5.0675 
DDLEX -7.2134 
DDLEX,, -4.9904 
The DL (.) variables are the first difference of the log variables while DDLEX is the second difference of the 
log of the nominal exchange rate. ECT,, is the lag of the error-correction term or the residuals of the 
cointegration regression.The tests were done using the PCGIVE software developed by Hendry (1989). The 
software was used to compute both the t-adf statistics and their critical values. 
2 0 RESEARCH PAPER 6 1 
The stationarity tests indicate that all the long-run RER model variables are non-
stationary as indicated by the ADF — augmented Dickey-Fuller — statistics that are 
greater than their critical value (-3.603) at the 5% significance level. All of the short-run 
RER variables are stationary except DL(RER) t, DL(AID) t, DL(OPEN) t | and DL(OPEN) i 
— the first lags of the real exchange rate, foreign aid, openness of the economy and 
contemporaneous level of openness, respectively. The t-ADF statistics for DL(RER) t ( 
DL(OPEN) t and DL(AlD) i | are, however, close to their critical values and thus we 
complemented the ADF test by the plot of these three variables. The plots suggest that 
the variables are fairly stationary. 
The long-run RER regression results 
In estimating the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) we first checked for 
cointegration between the contemporaneous RER and the explanatory variables in 
logarithmic levels. We started by estimating the general model (Equation 1) and testing 
for stationarity of the residuals. Once the residuals were found to be stationary, we 
tested for the goodness of fit (R 2) using the F-test. 
The estimated long-run equilibrium real exchange model is presented in Table 10. 
Table 10: The long-run equilibrium RER model results 
Modeling log(RER) by OLS 
Sample: 1967-1993 
Variable coefficient std.error t-value 
Constant 
log(AID) 
log(OPEN) 
log(GTEX) 
3.256 
0.560 
0.825 
-0.864 
0.494 
0.037 
0.067 
0.148 
6.592 
14.972 
12.333 
-5.831 
R2 = 0.962; F(3,23) = 192.56; RSS = 0.359; a = 0.125; DW = 1.97; 
Unit root test for residuals: t-adf(O) = -5.3795; t-adf(1) = -4.0076; Critical values for cointegration test with 25 
observations and three variables: -3.60 at 5% level; -3.20 at 10% level (see Blangiewicz and Charemza, 
1990, p. 310). 
Diagnostic tests: 
AR(1-2) F(2,21) =0.05087 
ARCH(1) F(1,21) =0.00439 
Normality %2 t = 0.75077 
RESET F(1,22) =0.04181 
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Figure 1: Long-run equilibrium real exchange rate 
2 1 
Figure 2: Residuals of the equilibrium real exchange rate 
ERER_Res= 
Omitted from the cointegration equation are the variables for government consumption, 
external terms of trade, import tariffs and technological progress. These variables were 
found not to be cointegrated with the long-run equilibrium RER. 
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The equilibrium real exchange rate and the residuals from the cointegration regression 
are shown in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. 
From Figure 2 we may say that the ERER residuals seem to be stationary and thus 
confirm the existence of cointegration between the real exchange rate, foreign aid, 
openness of the economy and government expenditure. 
As shown in Table 10, the unit root test for the residuals of the cointegration equation 
reveals that the residuals are stationary as indicated by ADF statistics that are less than 
their critical values (-3.60 at the 5% significance level). 
We then performed diagnostic tests for the cointegration equation (see Table 10). 
The maximum likelihood (LM) autocorrelation test indicates absence of autocorrelation 
since the AR (1-2) F-statistic is less than its critical value (of 3.47 at the 5% significance 
level). The ARCH( l ) test suggests the absence of autoregressive-conditional 
heteroscedastcity as indicated by the low F (1,21) statistic, which is lower than its critical 
value of 4.32 at the conventional significance level. The model also passes the normality 
Chi 2 test since the Chi 2 statistic is less than its critical value of 5.99 at 5% significance 
level. This implies that the residuals are white noise. The F (1,22) statistic for the 
regression specification test (RESET) — which is less than its 4.30 critical value at 5% 
significance level — suggests that our model is correctly specified in the sense that the 
values of the coefficients for the omitted variables are zeros. 
Total government expenditure is inversely related to the equilibrium real exchange 
rate in Tanzania and is statistically significant at the conventional level. This is consistent 
with the theoretical discussion above in which it was argued that increases in government 
consumption will tend to cause the real exchange rate to appreciate. The fact that the 
real exchange rate depreciated in the late 1980s and early 1990s is an indication that 
government expenditure has been curtailed. 
In line with the theory of real exchange rate determination, openness of the economy 
bears a positive sign and is statistically significant at 5% significance level. This suggests 
that the reduction in trade and exchange controls in Tanzania tends to cause real 
depreciation. 
Contrary to the RER theory, foreign aid bears an unexpected positive sign and is 
statistically significant at 5% significance level. This is to say that foreign aid inflow in 
Tanzania causes the real exchange rate to depreciate. A similar result was obtained 
(between capital flows and the RER) for Nigeria in the study by Ogun (1995). The 
positive correlation between foreign aid and the real exchange rate in Tanzania may be 
due to the fact that the aid inflows have a larger impact on the nominal exchange rate (or 
devaluation) through increased money supply than on the domestic price level or the 
consumer price index. 
The short-run RER regression results 
In estimating the short-run RER model we used residuals from the cointegration regression 
as the error-correction term (ECT). We then formed an error-correction model of the 
real exchange rate. The estimated general and parsimonious error-correction models are 
presented in Tables 11 and 12, respectively. 
FOREIGN AID AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN TANZANIA 23 
Table 11: The general short-run RER model estimates 
Modeling Alog(RER) by OLS 
Sample: 1970 - 1993 
Variable coefficient std.error t-value 
Constant -0.0429 0.0572 -0.750 
Alog(RER),., 0.7431 0.2136 3.479 
Alog(AID), 0.0731 0.0963 0.759 
Alog(AID),, -0.1090 0.1310 -0.832 
Alog(OPEN), 0.4343 0.1910 2.274 
AIog(OPEN),, 0.0249 0.1932 -0.129 
Alog(GTEX), -0.1637 0.1455 -1.125 
AlogCGTEX),., 0.1309 0.1974 0.663 
ECT,, -0.6667 0.2323 -2.871 
Alog(CRED), 0.0278 0.1774 0.157 
Alog(CRED)t1 0.1483 0.1919 0.772 
ADLEX, 0.6911 0.1261 5.482 
ADLEXM 0.0960 0.0691 1.390 
R 2 = 0 .966; F(12,11) = 25.937; RSS = 0 .049; a = 0 .067; D W = 2.10. 
Schwarz =-4.4813 
AR(1-1) F(1,10) = 0 .4409 
ARCH(1 ) F(1,9) = 0 .4368 
Normality f l = 0 .9795 
R E S E T F(1,10) = 2 .9565 
Table 12: The short-run RER parsimonious model estimates 
Modeling Alog(RER) by OLS 
Sample: 1970 - 1993 
Variable coefficient std.error t-value 
Constant -0.011694 0.01409 -0.830 
Alog(RER)t1 0.69702 0.11161 6.245 
Alog(AID), 0.13154 0.07111 1.850 
Alog(OPEN), 0.37350 0.12897 2.896 
Alog(GTEX), 0.18516 0.11835 -1.565 
ECT,., -0.54601 0.15076 -3.622 
ADLEX, 0.68907 0.08787 7.842 
R 2 = 0 .9551 ; F(6,17) = 60 .319; D W = 2.33; R S S = 0.0638;O = 0 .0597. 
Schwarz = -5.0025 
Diagnostic tests: 
AR(1-2) F(2,15) = 1.5414 
ARCH(1) F(1,13) = 0 .1407 
Normality %2 = 0 .8389 
R E S E T F(1,16) = 1.9789 
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From the general error-correction model, we eliminated variables that had low t-
statistics and applied the F-test to check for each of the reduced models. Omitted variables 
from the parsimonious model included the proxies for macroeconomic policy, that is 
excess credit as defined above, changes in the logarithm of nominal domestic credit and 
fiscal policy. 
The general short-run RER model passes the diagnostic tests for autocorrelation (the 
AR test), autoregressive-conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH test), normality Chi 2 test 
and the model specification (RESET) test as indicated by the test statistics, which are 
lower than their critical values at 5% significance level. 
The final and parsimonious model is presented in Table 12. The Schwarz criterion 
has fallen from -4.4813 in the general model to -5.0025 in the parsimonious model. This 
suggests that we have achieved model parsimony as we reduced the general model. 
We then tested for the stability of the coefficients of the parsimonious model. To do 
so we re-estimated the model using the recursive least squares (RLS) method. The results 
seem to suggest that all the variable coefficients were stable during the whole sample 
period. 
In Figures 3 and 4 we present graphs for the one-step residuals and the one-step 
Chow test, respectively. 
The graph for the one-step recursive residuals indicates that at no point in the sample 
period was the one-period equation error statistically significant. The one-step Chow 
test for the entire sample period indicates that over the period the model never failed to 
explain changes in the real exchange rate. 
The regression results for the dynamic parsimonious RER model indicate that in the 
short run the contemporaneous changes in government expenditure, openness of the 
economy and foreign aid inflows are significant determinants of the RER. While foreign 
aid and openness of the economy tend to depreciate the RER, government expenditure 
tends to appreciate it. The lag of the RER bears an expected positive sign. 
The error-correction term is negative and significant, implying that when the RER 
deviates from its equilibrium level, there will be a feedback mechanism (through changes 
in the fundamentals) to correct the misalignment. 
Nominal devaluation is significant and bears an expected positive sign. The large 
coefficient (0.69) suggests that devaluation is an important policy instrument for correcting 
misalignment of the real exchange rate. 
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Figure 3: One-step residuals 
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Figure 4: One-step Chow test 
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IV. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
In this paper we examined the question of foreign aid to see whether, through its impact 
on the real exchange rate, it causes Dutch disease in Tanzania. We then analysed the 
country's policy response to the influx of foreign aid. We argued that although seemingly 
beneficial, foreign aid may generate undesirable consequences for the recipient country. 
These undesirable impacts include appreciation of the real exchange rate and the 
consequent decline in export performance. 
The correct policy response to the aid syndrome is for economic agents to spend the 
aid money for direct productive investment to induce a positive supply response. The 
government (which is the main recipient of the aid) should also implement suitable 
economic policies that will offset the tendency for foreign aid to generate real appreciation. 
High on the list of the accompanying policies is enhancing economic liberalization, 
establishing a freely functioning foreign exchange market, and instituting non-inflationary 
monetary and fiscal policies. 
In the analysis of the determination of the real exchange rate, we found that the 
important determinants of the long-run RER are the extent of trade and exchange controls, 
government expenditure, and foreign aid inflows. In the short run, the RER is also 
determined by nominal devaluation. 
We cannot reject the hypotheses that increases in openness of the economy and nominal 
devaluation cause real depreciation and that increased government expenditure causes 
real appreciation. However, the hypothesis that foreign aid inflow causes real appreciation 
is rejected for the case of Tanzania. This then tends to refute the proposition that foreign 
aid has caused Dutch disease in the country, since rather than appreciating the real 
exchange rate, the aid leads to real depreciation. However, when the foreign exchange 
market is freely functioning, aid inflows will tend to appreciate the real exchange rate. 
This is therefore a problem that policy markers will have to deal with in the years to 
come. 
Notes 
1. For a detailed analysis of Dutch disease see Corden and Neary (1982). 
2. I would like to thank one anonymous referee who brought to my attention that, as 
observed by Boone (1995), the growth objectives may not be achieved because some 
(if not most) of the aid is spent on public consumption rather than investment. 
3. Another popular definition of the real exchange rate is based on the purchasing power 
parity (PPP) approach according to which the PPP real exchange rate (e p p p ) is defined 
as e p p p=E.P*/P where E is the nominal exchange rate and P* and P are the foreign 
and domestic consumer (or producer) price indexes, respectively. The P* and P are 
each weighted averages of tradeable and non-tradeable goods. Depending on the 
behaviour of foreign relative prices, (P T*/PN*), it can be shown that changes in the 
e p p p and RER=P y/P N are not the same and can even move in opposite directions (see 
Edwards, 1989, p. 6). 
4. There are multiple definitions and measurements of the phenomenon of "capital 
flight". For detailed analysis of capital flight, see Nyoni (1996), Eggerstedt et al. 
(1995), Cuddington (1986), and Lessard and Williamson (1987). 
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Appendix tables 
Table A1: Total government expenditure, population, gross domestic product and gross 
fixed capital formation in Tsh millions 
Year Total government 
expenditure 
in current Tsh 
Population GDP in 
current Tsh 
Real GDP in 
1976 Tsh 
Investment in 
1976 Tsh 
1967 1185 12.26 7343 15145 3216.83 
1968 1417 12.59 7874 15939 3334.55 
1969 1642 12.93 8271 16301 3011.85 
1970 1918 13.27 9174 16945 4447.88 
1971 2405 13.63 9814 17542 5471.01 
1972 2376 14.00 11172 18664 5111.84 
1973 2995 14.37 13103 19166 4940.14 
1974 4230 14.76 15994 19411 4837.63 
1975 6163 15.31 19011 20407 5022.06 
1976 6326 16.41 24419 21652 6074.55 
1977 6270 16.92 28868 21739 6663.00 
1978 9622 17.44 32169 22202 6717.94 
1979 11921 17.98 36283 22739 7150.56 
1980 13943 18.58 42118 23419 6372.20 
1981 14755 19.17 49102 23301 6694.87 
1982 17387 19.78 58226 23439 5786.66 
1983 18993 20.41 70509 22886 3340.73 
1984 20409 21.06 88892 23656 4231.16 
1985 28509 21.73 120621 24278 4509.56 
1986 31710 22.46 159648 25070 5980.44 
1987 47871 23.22 226444 26345 10053.78 
1988 75297 24.00 331217 27460 10711.77 
1989 106098 24.80 407085 28558 12019.45 
1990 140871 25.63 505210 29921 17098.17 
1991 207292 26.40 697688 31623 13692.20 
1992 261051 27.20 807336 32372 16259.50 
1993 336015 28.02 845485 33925 17538.39 
Sources: BOS (1994 a&b); IMF (1995). 
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Table A2: Selected macroeconomic indicators in Tanzania 
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Year TOT Official EXR Paral mrkt EXR Official EXR PREMIUM1 CPI 
(1977=100) (TShs/1 US$) (TShs/1 US$) (TShs/SDR) (1977=100) (1977=100 
1967 69.44 7.14 8.70 7.14 13.7 32.10 
1968 66.13 7.14 8.50 7.14 12.0 37.04 
1969 81.47 7.14 8.70 7.14 13.7 43.21 
1970 80.40 7.14 10.10 7.14 26.0 44.44 
1971 70.33 7.14 11.60 7.76 39.2 46.91 
1972 67.85 7.14 15.40 7.76 72.6 50.62 
1973 84.60 7.02 14.50 8.32 66.9 55.56 
1974 76.96 7.14 13.50 8.75 55.9 66.67 
1975 65.94 7.36 20.60 9.66 112.7 83.95 
1976 89.88 8.38 21.90 9.66 101.3 89.51 
1977 100.00 8.29 21.50 9.66 100.0 100.00 
1978 81.85 7 12 13.10 9.66 43.9 111.73 
1979 81.73 8.22 20.00 10.83 89.9 127.16 
1980 71.23 8.20 25.70 10.44 133.9 165.43 
1981 60.53 8.28 35.10 9.69 203.3 207.41 
1982 62.83 9.28 43.40 10.55 230.7 267.90 
1983 64.80 11.14 39.60 13.04 160.3 340.12 
1984 68.49 15.29 60.00 17.75 183.5 462.96 
1985 64.42 17.47 100.80 18.12 299.3 617.28 
1986 73.77 32.70 167.50 63.26 258.7 817.28 
1987 63.65 64.26 180.00 118.77 113.0 1062.35 
1988 62.00 99.29 210.00 168.21 70.0 1393.83 
1989 58.24 143.38 270.00 252.71 55.4 1753.70 
1990 50.03 195.06 330.00 279.70 43.4 2099.38 
1991 49.52 219.16 370.00 334.58 43.2 2567.28 
1992 45.13 297.71 450.00 460.63 32.1 3133.95 
1993 45.13 405.27 475.00 659.13 10.8 3869.14 
Source: BOS, various issues; IMF (1995) for the exchange rates; World Bank (1994) World Tables for 
external terms of trade; Kaufmann and O'Connell (1992) and own observations for parallel market exchange 
rates. 
11ndex of parallel market premium. The premium is computed as (EU-EO)/EO where EU and EO are the 
unofficial or parallel market and official nominal exchange rate, respectively. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Context 
Tanzania is one of the most aid-dependent countries in Africa, receiving more aid both in per 
capita terms and as a percentage of GDP than do other countries. Since the early 1980s, the 
massive aid inflows have supported a series of economic recovery and structural adjustment 
programmes instituted to pull the economy out of a steep decline. The aid presents an impor-
tant challenge to policy makers. 
What is the problem? 
While it may supplement domestic investment and growth, foreign aid may also generate 
undesirable effects such as an appreciating real exchange rate and declines in export perfor-
mance. These undesirable effects are commonly known as Dutch disease. 
This study used an econometric analysis to determine whether foreign aid inflows into 
Tanzania resulted in Dutch disease. That is, did foreign aid have undesirable consequences 
for the Tanzanian economy? The study examined the impact of aid inflows on such macro-
economic variables as the real exchange rate, export performance, government expenditure, 
investment and growth. 
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2 Foreign Aid and Economic Performance in Tanzania 2 
Foreign aid and macroeconomic management in Tanzania 
Tanzania faced severe economic crisis beginning in the late 1970s. The bad performance 
meant that the government was less able to balance its budget and hence took recourse i<> 
increased borrowing and foreign assistance. 
By the early 1980s the government realized it had to reform the economy. Policy makers 
began with the National Economic Survival Programme and structural adjustment programmes 
in 1981 and 1982, and then instituted two successive economic recovery programmes in 
1986 and 1989. 
These last two programmes, which were undertaken at the urging and with the support of 
the donor community, were the most successful. The main items of reform were devaluation 
of the currency, price decontrol, government retrenchment and opening up the economy to 
international trade. Increased openness was to be achieved by liberalizing imports and pro-
moting exports. 
Along with the reforms came massive aid inflows—increases in real terms from US$266.2 
million in 1985 to US$522.27 million in 1992. As a percentage of GDP, aid increased from 
an average of 9% during 1983-1985 to 34% in 1986-1993. Net official development assis-
tance to Tanzania since 1986 has been around US$1.0 billion per year. 
Arguments for foreign aid are based on the belief that the aid will contribute positively to 
the country's development efforts by, among other things, supplementing domestic savings 
and achieving higher economic growth. On the other hand, large aid inflows are thought to 
cause the real exchange rate to appreciate and result in loss of competitiveness of exports and 
subsequent decline in productivity. Much depends on how the aid is managed. 
Tanzania's foreign aid boom was marked by a declining share of government develop-
ment expenditure and an increasing recurrent expenditure as a percentage of GDP. This sug-
gests that the foreign aid allowed the government to free resources from development expen-
diture in order to maintain or increase its recurrent expenditure. Foreign aid was also accom-
panied by high rates of money growth and inflation, and declines in domestic savings. In-
vestment in agriculture declined, but growth in the manufacturing sector improved during 
the periods of high aid flows. The growth in manufacturing was not commensurate with the 
investment, however, mostly because of low capacity utilization and the anti-export bias in 
resource allocation. 
For most years since Tanzania's independence, imports of machinery and other metal 
goods (storables) have averaged about 1% of GDP per year. The aid boom beginning in 1986 
did not see an increase in these imports. Hence Tanzanians did not save the aid. The trend in 
foreign assets that corresponds to both the money base and the money supply indicates that 
foreign assets declined during the aid boom. Hence the aid money was left to filter into the 
economy unsterilized. 
Since the aid was neither saved by economic agents nor sterilized by monetary authori-
ties, it may be argued that Tanzanians perceived the aid inflow to be permanent. The rea 
exchange rate in Tanzania should as a result have appreciated in the late 1980s and earl; 
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1990s when there was a boom in aid inflows. This did not happen. The inability of aid 
inflows ID explain the real depreciation may be explained by the dominating impact of eco-
nomic liberalization and the devaluation of the nominal exchange rate. 
(.liwn that foreign aid seems to promote investment and growth in Tanzania, it is perti-
nent ti> ;isk whether or not and to what extent the country should continue to depend on 
foreign aid to achieve higher investment ratios and positive growth given the potential for a 
drastic cut-back in aid. 
The real exchange rate in Tanzania 
If foreign exchange is being rationed (as was the case in Tanzania), the result can be move-
ments of the real exchange rate that are different from those that would occur in the case of 
a freely functioning foreign exchange market. 
Foreign aid and (net capital) inflows tend to cause an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate by increasing real incomes and consequently the demand for both traded and non-traded 
goods. Because prices of imported goods are determined in the world market, a surge in 
demand for such goods will have no impact on domestic prices as long as the nominal ex-
change rate is not altered. The increase in demand for non-tradeables, however, will put 
upward pressure on domestic prices and thus cause real appreciation. 
The study shows that in Tanzania government expenditure is inversely related to the 
equilibrium real exchange rate. This is consistent with theory that argues that increase in 
government consumption will tend to cause the real exchange rate to appreciate. The fact 
that the real exchange rate depreciated in the late 1980s and early 1990s is an indication that 
government expenditure has been curtailed. 
Contrary to theory, however, the study shows that in Tanzania foreign aid did not cause 
the real exchange rate to appreciate, but did cause it to depreciate. This may be because the 
aid inflows have a larger impact on the nominal exchange rate (or devaluation) through 
increased money supply than on the domestic price level or the consumer price index. 
Foreign aid is only one of the variables that determine the long-run real exchange rate in 
Tanzania. The other important determinants are government expenditure and the extent of 
trade and exchange controls. In the short run, the real exchange rate is also determined by 
nominal devaluation. 
Implications for policy makers 
Since foreign aid inflows to Tanzania tend to depreciate the real exchange rate, they cannot 
be said to cause Dutch disease in the economy and the country should continue receiving 
foreign aid. 
However, Tanzania neither saves nor sterilizes its foreign aid, which indicates that mon-
etary authorities perceive aid flows to be a permanent fixture in the economy. This is danger-
ous, especially in an era of donor fatigue and increasing demands for available aid. A devel-
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opment strategy based on foreign assistance is bound to fail once the aid is cut significantly. 
The correct policy response to the aid syndrome is for economic agents to spend the aid 
money for direct productive investment to induce a positive supply response. The govern-
ment (which is the main recipient of aid) should also implement policies that will offset the 
tendency for foreign aid to generate real appreciation. High on the list of these measures is 
enhancing liberalization, establishing a freely functioning foreign exchange market, and in-
stituting non-inflationary monetary and fiscal policies. 
It should be remembered that one of the reasons Dutch disease did not occur in Tanzania 
is that the foreign exchange market was controlled. When the foreign exchange market is 
freely functioning, aid inflows will likely tend to appreciate the real exchange rate, accord-
ing to prevailing theory. This is a problem policy makers will have to deal with as they 
institute economic reforms. 
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